Few real-world hybrid systems are amenable to formal verification, due to their complexity and black box components. Optimization-based falsification-a methodology of search-based testing that employs stochastic optimization-is thus attracting attention as an alternative quality assurance method. Inspired by the recent work that advocates coverage and exploration in falsification, we introduce a two-layered optimization framework that uses Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS), a popular machine learning technique with solid mathematical and empirical foundations (e.g., in computer Go). MCTS is used in the upper layer of our framework; it guides the lower layer of local hill-climbing optimization, thus balancing exploration and exploitation in a disciplined manner. We demonstrate the proposed framework through experiments with benchmarks from the automotive domain.
. From Boolean to robust semantics. components (such as parts coming from external suppliers), make it very hard to apply formal verification to CPS.
An increasing number of researchers and practitioners are therefore turning to optimization-based falsification as a quality assurance measure for CPS. The problem is formalized as follows.
The Falsification Problem: 1) Given: A model M (that takes an input signal u and yields an output signal M(u)), and a specification ϕ (a temporal formula). / /
In the optimization-based falsification approach, the above falsification problem is turned into an optimization problem. This is possible thanks to robust semantics of temporal formulas [1] . Instead of the Boolean satisfaction relation v |= ϕ, robust semantics assigns a quantity v, ϕ ∈ R ∪ {∞, −∞} that tells us, not only whether ϕ is true or not (by the sign) but also how robustly the formula is true or false. This allows one to employ hill-climbing optimization (see Fig. 1 ): we iteratively generate input signals, in the direction of decreasing robustness, hoping that eventually we hit negative robustness. Optimization-based falsification is a subclass of searchbased testing: it adaptively chooses test cases (input signals u) based on previous observations. One can use stochastic algorithms for optimization, such as simulated annealing (SA), globalized Nelder-Mead (GNM [2] ), and covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES [3] ), which turn out to be much more scalable than model checking algorithms that rely on exhaustive search. Note also that the system model M can be black box: observing the correspondence between input u and output M(u) is enough. Observing an error M(u ) for some input u is sufficient evidence for a system designer to know that the system needs improvement. Besides these practical advantages, optimization-based falsification is an interesting topic from a scientific point of view, combining formal and structural reasoning with stochastic optimization.
The approach of optimization-based falsification was initiated in [1] and has been actively pursued ever since [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . See [15] for a recent survey. There are now mature tools, such as Breach [8] and S-Taliro [4] , which work with industrystandard Simulink models.
B. Exploration-Exploitation Tradeoff in Falsification
In optimization-based falsification, the important role of coverage is advocated by many authors [5] [6] [7] , [10] (see also Section V). One reason is that in highly nonconvex optimization problems for falsification, eager hill climbing can easily be trapped in local minima and thus fail to find an error input (i.e., a global minimum) that exists elsewhere. Another reason is that coverage gives a certain degree of confidence for absence of error input, in case search for error input is unsuccessful.
This puts us in the exploration-exploitation tradeoff, a typical dilemma in stochastic optimization and machine learning (specifically in reinforcement/active learning). While exploitation guides us to pursue the direction that seems promising, based on the previous observations, we have to occasionally explore in order to avoid getting stuck in local minima. Many common stochastic hill-climbing algorithms, such as SA, GNM, and CMA-ES, contain implicit exploration mechanisms. At the same time, explicit methods for exploration in falsification have been pursued, e.g., [5] [6] [7] and [10] (see Section V).
Contribution: Our main contribution is, in the context of hybrid system falsification, to balance exploration and exploitation in a systematic and mathematically disciplined way using Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS). We integrate hill-climbing optimization in MCTS, and obtain a two-layered optimization framework.
MCTS is an expected outcome [16] algorithm that searches a tree whose nodes are usually organized according to causal relationships, interleaving search (walking down the already expanded tree in a promising direction) with playout (expanding a new node and estimating its reward). One reason for the success of MCTS is that its search strategies nicely balance exploration and exploitation. The most common search strategy, UCT (upper confidence bound (UCB) applied to trees [17] ), is derived from the solid theoretical background of the UCBs strategy for multiarmed bandit problems [18] . Typical applications allowing such a structured search space are decision problems, such as games. In particular, MCTS is attracting a lot of attention thanks to its success in computer Go [19] . While MCTS is a relatively new methodology, it has already established its position in the rapidly growing community of machine learning (see [20] for a survey).
Our framework uses robustness values as rewards in MCTS, and employs hill-climbing optimization for playout in MCTS. This way we integrate hill-climbing in MCTS in a systematic way. In our two-layered framework (Fig. 2) , the upper optimization layer picks (by MCTS) a region in the input space, from which a concrete input value should be sampled. The lower layer then picks (by hill-climbing) an optimal concrete input value within the prescribed region. We also compute the robustness of the specification under the chosen input. This value is fed back to the upper layer as a reward, which is then used by the tree search strategy to balance exploration and exploitation.
In our two-layered framework, hill-climbing optimization-whose potential in falsification of hybrid systems has been established, see [15] -is supervised by MCTS, with MCTS dictating which region to sample from. By expanding new children, MCTS can tell the hill-climbing optimization to try an input region that has not yet been explored, or to exploit and dig deep in a direction that seems promising. This combination of MCTS and applicationspecific lower-layer optimization seems to be a useful approach that can apply to problems other than hybrid system falsification. See Section V for further discussion.
Our use of MCTS depends on our time-staged approach to falsification [21] , in which we synthesize K input segments one after another. Those input segments are for the time
where T is the time horizon. The search tree will then be of depth K (see Fig. 3 ). In this paper, we restrict input signals to piecewise-constant ones (this is a common assumption in falsification); an edge in the MCTS search tree from depth i − 1 to i (see Fig. 2 ) determines the input value u i for the interval [((i − 1)T/K), (iT/K)).
We have implemented our two-layered falsification framework in MATLAB, building on Breach [8] . 1 Our experiments with benchmarks from [22] [23] [24] demonstrate the possible performance improvements, especially in the ability of finding rare counterexamples.
Organization: In Section II, we formulate the falsification problem. In Section III, we present our main contribution, namely a two-layered optimization framework for falsification that combines MCTS and hill-climbing. Our experimental results are in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss related work, locating the current work in the context of falsification and also of other applications of MCTS and related machine learning methods. In Section VI, we conclude with some directions of future research.
Notations: The set of (positive, non-negative) real numbers is denoted by R (and R + , R ≥0 , respectively). Closed and open intervals are denoted such as [0, 2] and (2,
For a set X, |X| denotes its cardinality.
II. PROBLEM: HYBRID SYSTEM FALSIFICATION
We formulate the problem of hybrid system falsification. We also introduce robust semantics of temporal logics [1] , [9] that allows us to reduce falsification to an optimization problem. Some recent works, including [25] , use sequences of timestamped values as basic objects in their problem formulation, in place of continuous-time signals (as we do in the above). This difference is mostly presentational and not essential.
As a specification language we use signal temporal logic (STL) [26] . We do so for simplicity of presentation; we can also use more expressive logics such as the one in [27] .
In what follows Var is the set of variables. Variables stand for physical quantities, control modes, etc. ≡ denotes syntactic equality.
Definition 3 (Syntax): In STL, atomic propositions and formulas are defined as follows, respectively: α::≡(f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) > 0), and ϕ::
Here, f is an n-ary function f : R n → R, x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Var, and I is a closed nonsingular interval in R ≥0 , i.e., I = [a, b] or [a, ∞) where a, b ∈ R and a < b.
We omit subscripts I for temporal operators if I = [0, ∞). Other common connectives and operators, like ∨, →, , 2 I (always) and 3 I (eventually), are introduced as abbreviations:
Atomic formulas like f ( x) ≤ c, where c ∈ R is a constant, are also accommodated by using negation and the function f (
Definition 4 (Robust Semantics [9] ): For an n-dimensional signal w : R ≥0 → R n and t ∈ R ≥0 , w t denotes the t-shift of w, that is, w t (t ) := w(t + t ).
Let w : R ≥0 → R |Var| be a signal, and ϕ be an STL formula. We define the robustness w, ϕ ∈ R∪{∞, −∞} as follows, by induction. Here, and denote infimums and supremums of real numbers, respectively. Their binary version and denote minimum and maximum
Here are some intuitions and consequences of the definition. The robustness w, f ( x) > c stands for the vertical margin f ( x) − c for the signal w at time 0. A negative robustness value indicates how far the formula is from being true. The robustness for the eventually modality is computed by
The original semantics of STL is Boolean, given by a binary relation |= between signals and formulas. The robust semantics refines the Boolean one as follows: w, ϕ > 0 implies w |= ϕ, and w, ϕ < 0 implies w |= ϕ, see [1, Proposition 16] . Optimization-based falsification via robust semantics hinges on this refinement. Although the definitions so far are for timeunbounded signals only, we note that the robust semantics w, ϕ , as well as the Boolean satisfaction w |= ϕ, can be easily adapted to time-bounded signals (Definition 1).
Finally, here is a formalization of the falsification problem. It refines the description in Section I. In particular, its use of real-valued robust semantics enables hill-climbing optimization (see Fig. 1 ).
Definition 5 (Falsifying Input): Let M be a system model, and ϕ be an STL formula. A signal u :
III. TWO-LAYERED OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK WITH MONTE CARLO TREE SEARCH
In this section, we present our main contribution, namely a two-layered optimization framework for hybrid system falsification. It combines: MCTS [20] for high-level planning in the upper layer and hill-climbing optimization (such as SA, GNM [2] , and CMA-ES [3] ) for local input search in the lower layer. See Fig. 2 for a schematic overview. The upper layer steers the lower layer using the UCT strategy [17] , an established method in machine learning for balancing exploration and exploitation.
We present two algorithms: 1) the basic two-layered algorithm (Algorithm 1) and 2) a version enhanced with progressive widening (Algorithm 3). The auxiliary functions used therein are presented in Algorithm 2. Our algorithms work on an MCTS search tree, as illustrated in Fig. 4 .
A. Basic Two-Layered Algorithm (Algorithm 1)
We start with Algorithm 1, using the example in Fig. 4 .
1) Time Staging:
We search for a falsifying input signal, focusing on piecewise-constant signals 
the set of actions 3: T ← {ε} the MCTS search tree, initially root-only 4 :
− → u ← null place holder for a falsifying input 7: R min ← ∞ place holder for a minimum reward 8: − → a min ← null the most promising action sequence 9: while R(ε) ≥ 0 and within the MCTS budget do 10: MCTSSAMPLE(ε) 11: if − → u = null then a falsifying input is found already in preprocessing 12: return − → u 13: else return the most promising action sequence 14: return − → a min
if |w| < K then 18: if wa ∈ T for all a ∈ A then if all children have been expanded 19: a ← UCBSAMPLE(w) pick a child wa by UCB 20: MCTSSAMPLE(wa) recursive call 21 :
else 23: randomly sample a ∈ A from {a | wa ∈ T } expand a random unexpanded child wa 24 :
playout by hill-climbing 26 :
if R(wa) < 0 then 29: − → u ← u 1 . . . u K a falsifying input is found and stored in − → u 30: if R(wa) < R min then 31 : 33 :
− → x ← MCTSPREPROCESS 36: if − → x = − → u , an input signal then Line 11 37: return − → u 38: else − → x = a 1 a 2 . . . a K ∈ A * with some K ≤ K, Line 13 39: return arg min HillClimb Fig. 3, left) . The interval [0, T] is divided into K equal subintervals (K is a tunable parameter). The time points 0, (T/K), (2T/K), . . . , ((K − 1)T/K) at which those intervals start are called control points. Our goal is therefore to find a sequence u 1 , . . . , u K , where each u i = (u i1 , . . . , u iM ) is an M-dimensional real vector (M is the number of input signal dimensions for the model M), so that the corresponding piecewise-constant signal is a falsifying one (Definition 5). return arg max
The input region for an action a ∈ A is of the form (k 1 , . . . , k M ), see Line 2 of Algorithm 1 4 :
The same data as required in Algorithm 1, and additionally, constants C, α (used in Line 4)
The algorithm is the same as Algorithm 1, except that the function MCTSSAMPLE is replaced by the following one. 
S ← (a maximal convex subset of wa ∈T REG(a )) 10 :
playout by hill-climbing 11: a ← a ∈ A such that u d+1 ∈ REG(a) 12 :
if R(wa) < R min then 18: R min ← R(wa) 19: − → a min ← a 1 . . . a d a 20 :
We assume intervals
2) Search Tree: A search tree in MCTS has a branching degree |A|, where the set A is called an action set in the MCTS literature. In Go, for example, an action set A consists of possible moves.
We use, as the action set A, a partitioning of the input space I 1 × · · · × I M . We partition the input space into L 1 × · · · × L M hypercubes of equal size, according to predetermined parameters L 1 , . . . , L M , where M is the number of input signals of the system and L i indicates how finely the ith input should be partitioned. In Fig. 4 , we present an example where M = 2 and L 1 = L 2 = 2. There we have four actions in the set A, corresponding to the four square regions.
An edge in our search tree represents a choice of an input region-from which we choose the input value u i -for a single control point ((i − 1)T/K). The depth of the tree is K (the number of control points). We follow the usual con- Fig. 4 . Our MCTS search tree for a system model M with two input signals, throttle and brake, whose ranges are [0, 100] and [0, 325], respectively. We partition each range into two intervals, i.e., L 1 = L 2 = 2, hence the branching degree |A| is 2 × 2.
vention and specify a node of a |A|-branching tree by a word w = a 1 a 2 . . . a j over the alphabet A, where j ≤ K. That is: the root is ε (the empty word), its child in the direction a 1 ∈ A is a 1 , its children are a 1 a 1 , a 1 a 2 , . . . , and so on.
In general, a node in an MCTS search tree is decorated by two values: reward R and visit count N. In our case, R stores the current estimate of the smallest (i.e., the best) robustness value. Both values are updated explicitly during back-propagation (see below).
3) Monte Carlo Tree Search Sampling: Much like usual MCTS, Algorithm 1 iteratively expands the search tree T . Initially the tree T is root-only (line 3), and in each iteration-called MCTS sampling-the invocation of MCTSSAMPLE on line 10 adds one new node to T . In the MCTS literature, expanding a child means adding the child to T . We repeat MCTS sampling until a counterexample is found, or the MCTS budget is used up after the maximum number of iterations (line 9).
The exploration-exploitation tradeoff in MCTS comes in the choice of the node to add. In each MCTS sampling, we start from the root (line 10), walk down the tree T , choosing already expanded nodes (lines 19 and 20), until we expand a child (lines 23 and 24). Growing a wider tree means exploration, while a deeper tree means exploitation.
We use the UCT strategy [17] , the most commonly used strategy in MCTS, to resolve the dilemma. UCT is based on the UCB strategy for the multiarmed bandit problems [18] ; line 2 of Algorithm 2 follows UCB, where the exploitation score 1 − (R(wa)/[ max w ∈T R(w )]) and the exploration score √ (2 ln N(w)/N(wa)) are superposed using a scalar c. Recall that our rewards R(wa) for w's children are given by robustness estimates from previous simulations, and that falsification favors smaller R. Note also that values of R can be greater than 1. In the exploitation score 1 − (R(wa)/[ max w ∈T R(w )]), therefore, we normalize rewards to the interval [0, 1] and reverse their order. 2 The exploration score √ (2 ln N(w)/N(wa)) is taken from UCB: the visit count N(w) gives how many times the node w has been visited, that is, how many offspring the node w currently has in T . The scalar, for the tradeoff, is a tunable parameter, as usual in MCTS.
4) Playout and Back-Propagation:
In MCTS, the reward of a newly expanded node a 1 a 2 . . . a d a (see line 24) is computed by an operation called playout. The result is then backpropagated, in a suitable manner, to the ancestors: a 1 . . . a d , a 1 . . . a d−1 , . . . , and finally ε.
In our MCTS algorithms for falsification we use hillclimbing optimization (e.g., SA, GNM, and CMA-ES) for playout. See line 25, where input values u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u K are sampled by stochastic hill-climbing optimization, so that the resulting robustness value of the specification ϕ becomes smaller. The regions from which to sample those values are dictated by the MCTS tree: u 1 ∈ REG(a 1 ), . . . , u d ∈ REG(a d ) follow the actions a 1 , . . . , a d determined so far (here REG is from Algorithm 2); u d+1 ∈ REG(a) follows the newly chosen action a (line 23); and the remaining values u d+2 , . . . , u K can be chosen from the whole input range I 1 × · · · × I M . Fig. 5 illustrates an example of playout by hill-climbing optimization. Smaller gray squares represent actions, and red dots represent input values (notice that they are chosen from the gray regions). The values u 1 , . . . , u K are sampled repeatedly so that the robustness value M(u 1 . . . u K ), ϕ becomes smaller.
An intuition of this playout operation is that we sample the best input signal, u 1 . . . u K , under the constraints imposed by the MCTS search tree (namely, the input regions prescribed by the actions). The least robustness value thus obtained is assigned to the newly expanded node wa as its reward (line 27). If R(wa) < 0 then this means we have already succeeded in falsification (line 29).
Back-Propagation is an important operation in MCTS. Following the intuition that the reward R(w) is the smallest robustness achievable at the node w, we define the reward of an internal node w by the minimum of its children's rewards (see lines 21 and 33) . Note that, via recursive calls of MCTSSAMPLE (line 20), the result of playout is propagated to all ancestors.
5) Two-Layered Framework:
In Algorithm 1, hill-climbing optimization occurs twice, in lines 25 and 39. The first occurrence is in playout of MCTS-this way we interleave MCTS optimization (by growing a tree) and hill-climbing optimization (see Fig. 2 ). MCTS optimization is considered to be a preprocessing phase in Algorithm 1 (line 35): its principal role is to find an action sequence − → a min , i.e., a sequence of input regions, that is most promising. In the remainder of the MAIN function, the second hill-climbing optimization is conducted for falsification, where we sample according to − → a min .
The two occurrences of hill-climbing optimization therefore have different roles. Given also the fact that the first occurrence is repeated every time we expand a new child, we choose to spend less time for the former than the latter. In our implementation, we set the timeout to be 5-15 s for the first hill-climbing sampling in line 25 (TO po in Section IV), while for the second hill-climbing sampling in line 39 the timeout is 300 s.
A falsifying input − → u is often found already in the preprocessing phase. In this case the MAIN function simply returns − → u (line 37).
B. Two-Layered Algorithm With Progressive Widening (Algorithm 3)
Our second algorithm (Algorithm 3) differs from the basic one (Algorithm 1) in two ways.
1) Progressive Widening: Algorithm 3 uses progressive widening [28] ; see line 4. Unlike in the basic algorithm (line 18 of Algorithm 1), we do not always expand a new child, even if there are unexpanded ones; the threshold C·N(w) α is computed using the visit count N(w) and tunable parameters C, α.
Progressive widening is a widely employed technique in MCTS for coping with a large or infinite action set A-in such a case expanding all children incurs a lot of computational cost (see [29] ). In our Algorithm 3 the action set A can be large, depending on the numbers L 1 , . . . , L m of input range partitions.
2) Hill-Climbing Optimization for Expanding Children: In progressive widening, since we may not expand all the children, it makes sense to be selective about which child to expand. This is in contrast to random sampling in Algorithm 1 (line 23). See line 10 of Algorithm 3, where we first playout by hill-climbing optimization. The value u d+1 thus obtained is then used to determine which child wa to expand, in line 11. In order to ensure that the new child wa is indeed previously unexpanded, the value u d+1 is sampled from the set wa ∈T REG(a ); in fact, we restrict to its convex subset (line 9), because many hill-climbing optimization algorithms work best in a convex domain (see Fig. 6 for illustration).
C. Discussion
Our algorithms interleave MCTS optimization and hillclimbing optimization: the latter is used in the playout operation of the former, for sampling and estimating the reward of a high-level input-synthesis strategy. This high-level strategy is concretely given by a sequence a 1 a 2 . . . a d of input regions. Via the UCT tree search strategy, we ensure that our search in a search tree is driven not only by depth but also by width. This way we enhance exploration in search-based falsification, in the sense that different regions of the input space are sampled in a structured and disciplined manner. It is an interesting topic for future work to quantify the coverage guarantees that can potentially be achieved by our approach.
In falsification of hybrid systems, it is often the case that simulation, i.e., running a model M under a given input signal, is computationally the most expensive operation. In our algorithm this occurs in lines 25 and 39, since a hill-climbing optimization algorithm tries many samples of u 1 , . . . , u K . Simplifying line 25, e.g., by decimating the control points, can result in a useful variation of our algorithm.
Among the tunable parameters of the algorithm is the scalar c, used for the UCB sampling (line 2 of Algorithm 2). Having this parameter is unique to our falsification framework, in comparison to simple robustness-guided optimization (with hill-climbing only). Specifically, the parameter c endows our algorithm with flexibility in the exploration-exploitation tradeoff. Given the diversity of instances of the hybrid system falsification problem, it is unlikely that there is a single value of c that is optimal for all falsification examples. An engineer can then use her/his expert domain knowledge to tune the parameter c.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented our basic algorithm (Algorithm 1, denoted "Basic") and our progressive widening algorithm (Algorithm 3, denoted "P.W.") in MATLAB, using Breach [8] as a front-end for hill-climbing optimization and for its implementation of the robust semantics.
The experiments have two goals. First, in Section IV-B, we evaluate the falsification performance of our proposal in comparison to the state-of-the-art. Since our MCTS enhancement emphasizes coverage, our interest is in the success rate in hard problem instances rather than in execution time. Second, in Section IV-C, we evaluate the impact of different choices of parameters for our algorithms (such as the UCB scalar c in Algorithm 2).
A. Experiment Setup
The experiments are based on the following benchmarks. The automatic transmission (AT) model is a Simulink model that was proposed as a benchmark for falsification in [22] . It has input signals throttle ∈ [0, 100] and brake ∈ [0, 325], and computes the car's speed speed, the engine rotation rpm, and the selected gear gear. We consider the following specifications, taken in part from [22] . S1 ≡ 2 [0, 30] (speed < 120) can be falsified easily by hill-climbing with an input throttle = 100 and brake = 0 throughout. S2 ≡ 2 [0, 30] (gear = 3 → speed ≥ 20) states that in gear three, the speed should not get too low. The difficulty arises from the lack of guidance by robustness as long as gear = 3: we follow [22] and take gear = 1, . . . , gear = 4 as Boolean propositions, instead of taking gear as a numeric variable. In contrast to [22] , we use a more difficult speed threshold of 20 instead of 30.
S3 ≡ 3 [10, 30] (speed ∈ [53, 57]) states that it is not possible to maintain a constant speed after 10 s. A falsifying trace needs precise inputs to hit and maintain the narrow speed range.
S4 ≡ 2 [0, 29] (speed < 100) ∨ 2 [29, 30] (speed > 65) is a specification designed to demonstrate the limitation of robustness-guided falsification by hill-climbing optimization only. Here, a falsifying trajectory has to reach high speed before braking. Similarly to S2, the speed 100 has to be reached much earlier than the indicated time bound of 29 to give sufficient time for deceleration. However, by using the maximum as semantics for the ∨-connective, the robustness computation can shadow either of the disjuncts.
S5 ≡ 2 [0, 30] (rpm < 4770 ∨ 2 [0,1] (rpm > 600)) aims to prevent systematic sudden drops from high to low rpm. It is falsified if an rpm peak above 4770 is immediately followed by a drop to rpm ≤ 600.
The second benchmark is the abstract fuel control (AFC) model [23] . It takes two input signals, pedal angle and engine speed, and outputs the critical signal air-fuel ratio (AF), which influences fuel efficiency and car performance. The value is expected to be close to a reference value AFref . The pedal angle varies in the range [0, 61.1] and the engine speed varies in the range [900, 1100]. According to [23] , this setting corresponds to normal mode, where AFref = 14.7.
The basic requirement of the AFC is to keep the air-to-fuel ratio AF close to the reference AFref . However, changes to the pedal angle cause brief spikes in the output signal AF before the controller is able to regulate the engine. Falsification is used to discover the amplitude and periods of such spikes.
The formal specification Sbasic is [11, 30] (¬(|AF − AFref | > 0.05 * 14.7)). It is violated when AF deviates from its AFref too much. Another specification is Sstable: ¬(3 [6, 26] [0,4] (|AF − AFref | > 0.01 * 14.7)). The goal is to find spikes where the ratio is off by a fraction 0.01 of the reference value for at least t seconds during the interval [6, 26] .
The third benchmark model is called free floating robot (FFR) that has been considered as a falsification benchmark in [24] . It is a robot vehicle powered by four boosters and moving in two spatial dimensions. It is governed by the following second-order differential equations:
The goal of the robot is to steer from (x, y, φ) = (0, 0, 0) to x = y = 4, with a tolerance of 0.1, such thatẋ andẏ are within [ − 1, 1], given a time horizon of T = 5. The four inputs u i ∈ [−10, 10] range over the same domain. We run falsification on the negated requirement: Strap ≡ ¬ 3 [0, 5] x, y ∈ [3.9, 4.1] ∧ x,ẏ ∈ [−1, 1].
The experiments use Breach version 1.2.9 and MATLAB R2017b on an Amazon EC2 c4.large instance (March 2018, 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2666, 2 virtual CPU cores, 4 GB main memory).
B. Performance Evaluation
The results are shown in Table I and are grouped with respect to the method: uniform random sampling ("Random") as a baseline, Breach, our Basic algorithm (Algorithm 1) and our P.W. algorithm (Algorithm 3), as well as with respect to the underlying hill-climbing optimization solver (CMA-ES, GNM, and SA). Run times are shown in seconds. Since the algorithms are stochastic, we give the success rate out of a number of trials.
For all the experiments, input signals are chosen to be piecewise constant, with K = 5 control points for AT and AFC, and K = 3 control points for FFR (due to the shorter time horizon). These numbers coincide with the depth of the MCTS search trees. In Breach, this is achieved with the "UniStep" input generator, with its .cp attribute set to K. The timeout for Breach was set to 900 s (which is well above all successful falsification trials) with no upper limit on the number of simulations. For our P.W. algorithm, we used the parameters C = 0.7 and α = 0.85 (line 4 of Algorithm 3).
The choice of parameters for our two MCTS-based algorithms is as follows: for each combination with the hillclimbing optimization solvers, we present a set of parameters that give good results over all the specifications. This is justified, because the performance is quite dependent on these parameters, and one choice that works for a given combination of a falsification algorithm and a hill-climbing solver might just not work for another combination. However, note that we do not change the settings across the specifications.
As we discuss at the end of Section III-A, different timeouts are set for hill-climbing in playout (line 25 of Algorithm 1) and to hill-climbing at the end (line 39 of Algorithm 1). Specifically, the timeout for the former is TO po in Table I (5-15 s) while the timeout for the latter is globally 300 s.
The results in Table I indicate, at a high-level, that for seemingly hard problems, the benefit of the extra exploration done by the MCTS layer significantly increases the falsification rate. This is most evident in S4 and S5, where Breach (with any of CMA-ES, GNM, or SA) has at most 30%-40% success rates. Our MCTS enhancements succeed much more often.
For easy problems, the increased exploration typically increases the falsification times, which is expected. One reason is that falsification is in general a hard problem that can only be tackled by heuristics. We note from Table I that the additional execution time is often not prohibitively large. We also note that there is generally no single algorithm that works on all instances equally well. For example, for Sstable, both Breach and our algorithms are even weaker than random testing. However, our algorithms still increase the falsification rate compared to Breach. The choice of a hill-climbing optimization solver has a great influence on the outcome. CMA-ES has built-in support for some exploration before the search converges in the most promising direction. Nevertheless, we see that the upperlayer optimization by MCTS can improve success rates (S4, S5, Sstable). The Nelder-Mead variant GNM has very little support for exploration and furthermore, Breach's implementation is not stochastic (it uses deterministic low-discrepancy sequences as a source of quasi-randomness). For this reason, the method quickly converges to nonfalsifying minima that are local and cannot be escaped without extra measures. Thus, using MCTS pays off especially with GNM; see for example S3 and S4. Conversely, SA heavily relies on exploration and keeps just a single good trace found so far, limiting its exploitation. In combination with MCTS, SA shows mixed performance. In some cases falsification time becomes longer (S1, S3), whereas for S4, MCTS is able to overcome this particular limitation, presumably because it maintains several good prefixes. For the FFR, we observe that our approach needs additional time in comparison to Breach with CMA-ES (within an order of magnitude), which is reasonable given the added exploration on the exponentially larger state space. However, it does increase the falsification rate with GNM and SA, for the same reasons as before.
The difference between the two variants, Algorithms 1 and 3 (the latter with progressive widening), is not significant on most of the examples. However, progressive widening has a positive effect on the success rate and falsification time for S2 and S5.
In the experiments, we set the MCTS budget (number of iterations of the main loop) to be 20-40. Note that the number of all possible nodes is much greater: it is (1+|A|+|A| 2 +· · ·+ |A| K ). For AT and AFC (2 input signals, L = 3×5 and K = 5), it is 813 616; and for FFR (4 input signals, L = 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 and K = 3), it is 4369. The overall success rates seem to suggest that, not only in computer Go but also in hybrid system falsification, MCTS is very effective in searching in a vast space with limited resources.
C. Evaluation of Parameter Choices
We evaluate the effect of the parameters using the specification S4 for the AT model, where the success of falsification varies strongly. For the experiments in this section we focus on Algorithm 1 (Basic). Table II contains four subtables, each showing the results for the different optimization solvers when varying a hyperparameter.
The first concern is about the scalar c for exploration/exploitation. We observe that there is a general trend that falsification rate improves with increased focus on exploration. It is particularly evident when comparing the results of c = 0.02 and c = 0.5. However, no significant performance gap is observed between c = 0.5 and c = 1.0, indicating that c = 0.5 is already sufficient for optimization solvers to benefit from exploration.
Next, consider the results for different partitioning of the input space, where L = n × m means that the throttle range is partitioned into n actions and the brake range into m actions (for the AT model; pedal and engine for the AFC model). We note that the different choices have much less influence than the scalar c. However, there are some differences, for example GNM seems to cope badly with the coarse partitioning 2 × 2 in the first column, which could be attributed to its reliance on guidance by the MCTS layer. With respect to the timeout for individual playouts TO PO , we observe that it is correlated with overall falsification time. This is expected, as we spend more time in nonfalsifying regions of the input space as well.
Varying the number of control points K (and therefore the depth of the MCTS tree), shows that for the respective requirement, K = 3 is insufficient but the results for more control points are not clear. As more control points make the problem harder due to the larger search space, the falsification rate drops (specifically for K = 10). Note that we purposely keep the MCTS budget and playout time consistent to expose this effect, whereas in practice one might want to increase the limits when the problem is more complex.
V. RELATED WORK
Formal verification approaches to correctness of hybrid systems employ a wide range of techniques, including model checking, theorem proving, rigorous numerics, nonstandard analysis, and so on [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . These are currently not very successful in dealing with complex real-world systems, due to issues like scalability and black-box components.
Optimization-based falsification of hybrid systems has therefore attracted attention as a testing technique that adaptively searches for error input using algorithms, using recent advances in machine learning. An overview is given in [15] .
We now discuss the relationship between the current work and existing works in the context of falsification.
Monte Carlo sampling is used in [37] for falsification. Our thesis is that MCTS an extension of Monte Carlo methods-yields a powerful guiding method in optimization-based falsification.
The so-called multiple-shooting approach to falsification is studied in [11] . It consists of an upper layer that searches for an abstract error trace given by a succession of cells and a lower layer, where an abstract error trace is concretized to an actual error trace by picking points from cells. This two-layered framework differs from ours: they focus on safety specifications (avoiding an unsafe set); this restriction allows search heuristics that rely on spacial metrics (such as A * search). In our current work, we allow arbitrary STL specifications and use robustness values as guidance. Our framework can be seen as an integration of multiple-shooting (the upper layer) and single-shooting (the lower layer); they are interleaved in the same way as search and sampling are interleaved in MCTS.
Besides MCTS, Gaussian process learning has also attracted attention in machine learning as a clean way of balancing exploitation and exploration. The GP-UCB algorithm is a widely used strategy there. Its use in hybrid system falsification is pursued, e.g., [12] and [13] .
The value of exploration/coverage has been recognized in the falsification community [5]- [7] , [10] , not only for efficient search for error inputs but also for correctness guarantees in case no error input is found. In this line, the closest to the current work is [5] , in which search is guided by a coverage metric on input spaces. The biggest difference in the current work is that we structure the input space by time, using time stages (see Fig. 3 ). We explore this staged input space in the disciplined manner of MCTS. In [5] there is no such staged structure in input spaces, and they use support vector machines (SVMs) for identifying promising regions. Underminer [38] is a falsification tool that learns the (non-)convergence of a system to direct falsification and parameter mining. It supports STL formulas, SVMs, neural nets, and Lyapunov-like functions as classifiers.
Tree-based search is also used in [10] for falsification. They use rapidly exploring random trees, a technique widely used for path planning in robotics. Their use of trees is geared largely toward exploration, using the coverage metric called star discrepancy as guidance. In their algorithm, robustness-guided hill-climbing optimization plays a supplementary role. This is in contrast to our current framework, where we use MCTS and systematically integrate it with hill-climbing optimization.
Many works in coverage-guided falsification [7] , [10] use metrics in the space of output or internal states, instead of the input space. A challenge in such methods is that, in a complex model, the correlation between input and output/state is hard to predict. It is hard to steer the system's output/state to a desired region.
There have been efforts to enhance expressiveness of MTL and STL, so that engineers can express richer intentions-such as time robustness and frequency-in specifications [27] , [39] . This research direction is orthogonal to ours; we are able to investigate the use of such logics in our current framework. Other recent works with which our current results could be combined include [25] , which mines parameter regions, and [14] that aims to exploit features of machine learning components of system models for the sake of falsification.
We believe that the combination of MCTS and applicationspecific lower-layer optimization-an instance of which is the proposed falsification framework-is a general methodology applicable to a variety of applications. For example, for the MaxSAT problem, the work [40] uses MCTS combined with hill-climbing local optimization.
Use of MCTS for search-based testing of hybrid systems is pursued in [29] . We differ from [29] in the target systems: ours are deterministic, while [29] searches for random seeds for stochastic systems. We also combine robustness-guided hillclimbing optimization.
There are strong similarities between our falsification approach using MTCS and statistical model checking using importance splitting [41] . The robustness semantics of STL can be seen as a "heuristic score function" [42] , with both approaches using time staging and the notion of "levels" to iteratively guide the search to more promising subspaces. The principal difference is that importance splitting randomly explores a diverse set of traces that satisfy the property (in order to reduce the variance of the estimate of its probability), while our falsification approach finds a single falsifying input by optimizing (exploiting) the results of random exploration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a two-layered optimization framework for hybrid system falsification. It combines MCTS-a widely used stochastic search method that effectively balances exploration and exploitation-and hill-climbing optimization-a local search method whose use in hybrid system falsification is established in the community. Our experiments demonstrate its promising performance.
In addition to the future work already outlined in Section V, we add the following.
We have shown how systematic exploration can improve the chances of finding error input. Such exploration can also be used as a measure of confidence about a system's validity, in the case that no error input is found (see [5] , [10] and Section V). Concretely, it would be interesting to compute a quantitative coverage metric from the result of our MCTS algorithm.
Our choice of simple grid partitioning of actions in MCTS search trees achieves good performance. Other choices are also possible, such as using the extension of MCTS to continuous action sets in [28] and [43] .
Finally, an extension of our framework to stochastic hybrid systems does not seem hard, following the MCTS approach in [29] that uses models with direct access to randomness seeds (see Section V).
